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REFRAMING THE PUNISHMENT TEST THROUGH 
MODERN SEX OFFENDER LEGISLATION 
Jane Ramage* 
 
Modern sex offender registration and notification laws blur the distinction 
between criminal and civil law.  Despite being labeled as civil regulatory 
schemes, these laws impose severe burdens on personal liberty—burdens 
that we tend to associate with criminal punishment.  In 2003, the U.S. 
Supreme Court determined that at least one sex offender registration and 
notification program functioned as a civil remedy rather than a criminal 
sanction.  In upholding the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act, the 
Supreme Court held that the burdens imposed by the statute did not impose 
additional punishment on registered sex offenders and thus did not trigger 
the constitutional protections reserved for criminal defendants.  
As sex offender legislation has grown in scope and severity, federal courts 
have continued to reject challenges brought by registered sex offenders who 
allege that these programs impose additional punishment.  In 2016, however, 
the Sixth Circuit broke new ground and determined that the requirements set 
forth in the amendments to the Michigan Sex Offender Registration Act had 
transformed the scheme from civil to criminal.  This Note explores the 
growing circuit split among federal courts in assessing the nature of sex 
offender legislation and proposes that courts reframe the current punishment 
analysis to resolve these inconsistencies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1979, six-year-old Etan Patz was abducted while walking to his school 
bus stop two blocks from his home in New York City.1  In 1981, six-year-
old Adam Walsh was kidnapped and murdered after he was abducted from a 
shopping mall in Florida.2  In 1989, eleven-year-old Jacob Wetterling was 
abducted by a masked gunman while riding his bike in St. Joseph, 
Minnesota.3  In 1994, seven-year-old Megan Kanka was raped and murdered 
by her neighbor in Hamilton Township, New Jersey.4  The common thread 
that connected these four brutal tragedies was the public belief that the 
perpetrator in each case had harmed children before.5 
The brutality of the crimes committed against Etan, Adam, Jacob, and 
Megan, coupled with the possibility that the childrens’ suffering could have 
been prevented, mobilized both activists and legislators to demand change.6  
In response to growing public outrage and political pressure, Congress 
passed the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent 
Offender Registration Act7 (the “Wetterling Act”) and Megan’s Law.8  
 
 1. Rick Rojas, What Happened to Etan Patz?: Unraveling a Nearly 40-Year-Old Case, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/nyregion/what-happened-
to-etan-patz.html [https://perma.cc/82FP-LDVK]. 
 2. Karen J. Terry & Alissa R. Ackerman, A Brief History of Major Sex Offender Laws, 
in SEX OFFENDER LAWS:  FAILED POLICIES, NEW DIRECTIONS 50, 58 (Richard G. Wright ed., 
2d ed. 2015). 
 3. Id. at 57. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See id. at 57–58. 
 6. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, SHAMING THE CONSTITUTION:  
THE DETRIMENTAL RESULTS OF SEXUAL VIOLENT PREDATOR LEGISLATION 44 (2017). 
 7. Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. XVII, 108 Stat. 2038 (1994) (repealed 2006). 
 8. Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (repealed 2006). 
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Together, these laws required states to implement registration and 
notification programs to monitor convicted “sex offenders.”9 
To comply with the federal requirements, states were obligated to collect 
and manage personal information from people qualifying as sex offenders 
under the statute and disclose the presence of registrants10 to members of the 
community.11  Inherent in the political discourse supporting sex offender 
legislation was the notion that parents should have the right to know if their 
neighbors pose a danger to their children.12  By compiling registrants’ 
information and notifying community members of their presence, Congress 
and compliant states sought to provide comfort to parents and prevent future 
crimes against children.13 
Following the implementation of sex offender registration and notification 
(SORN) programs in the states, registrants began to challenge the schemes 
as additional forms of criminal punishment in violation of the U.S. 
Constitution.14  In 2003,15 the U.S. Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe16 upheld 
Alaska’s SORN law on the grounds that it did not, expressly or in effect, 
punish those subject to its requirements.17  This Note will refer to the state 
laws challenged prior to Smith and the Alaskan statute at issue in Smith as 
“first-generation” SORN laws. 
In the years following the Supreme Court’s decision, Congress and state 
legislatures amended existing SORN programs by increasing registration 
requirements and expanding the scope of community notification.18  With the 
growth of sex offender legislation, registrants launched a second round of 
challenges, alleging that the more burdensome and expansive laws were 
distinguishable from first-generation laws and had become criminal in 
nature.19  This Note will refer to these amendments as “modern” SORN laws. 
Until 2016, it appeared that any challenges brought against both first-
generation and modern SORN laws were foreclosed by Smith, no matter how 
dissimilar they were to the original Alaskan statute considered by the Court.20  
Almost universally, federal courts rejected arguments brought by registrants 
 
 9. See WAYNE A. LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER:  CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND 
COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAWS IN AMERICA 55–56 (2009). 
 10. This Note will refer to persons required to register as sex offenders in their respective 
federal, state, and local jurisdictions as “registrants.” 
 11. See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 6, at 43–44. 
 12. See 140 CONG. REC. 21,557 (1994) (statement of Rep. Smith) (“Had Megan’s grieving 
parents known that their neighbor was a dangerous person, they would have taken steps to 
protect their precious child.  Megan’s parents had a right to know.”); 140 CONG. REC. 19,545 
(1994) (statement of Sen. Gorton) (“The families in these communities and these innocent 
victims had a right to know that dangerous sexual predators were in their midst.”). 
 13. See LOGAN, supra note 9, at 56. 
 14. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 15. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 16. 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
 17. Id. at 85. 
 18. See infra Part II.C. 
 19. See infra Part III. 
 20. See infra Part III.A. 
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based on the same justification used by the Supreme Court in Smith—SORN 
laws are civil in nature.21 
In 2016, however, the Sixth Circuit approached the punishment question 
differently.22  In its unprecedented decision Does #1–5 v. Snyder,23 the Sixth 
Circuit determined that SORN regimes can impose additional forms of 
punishment through broad and overly burdensome provisions.24  Paving a 
new course for federal courts, the Sixth Circuit drew a distinction between 
the Alaskan statute at issue in Smith and modern SORN laws.25  Today, a 
minority of federal courts have followed the Sixth Circuit’s lead in 
determining that some modern SORN programs go too far and function to 
punish sex offenders in their pursuit of safety.26 
This Note explores the emerging circuit split by analyzing how federal 
courts have inconsistently interpreted Smith and unpredictably applied the 
Court’s analysis to modern SORN laws.  Part I provides a brief explanation 
of the criminal-civil distinction and the constitutional implications of the 
criminal designation.  Part II examines the history of SORN laws by looking 
at first-generation programs and modern regimes and the constitutional 
challenges raised in response to both.  Part III explores the circuit split 
stemming from the varied applications of the relevant punishment analysis.  
Part IV proposes alterations to the current test that could resolve the 
inconsistencies among federal courts and preserve the constitutional 
protections afforded to criminal defendants. 
I.  THE PUNISHMENT QUESTION 
Sex offender registration and notification schemes are frequently 
challenged as forms of criminal punishment in violation of the constitutional 
provisions that protect criminal defendants.27  Before addressing these 
challenges, this Note explores the distinctions between criminal and civil law 
and the constitutional repercussions of that divide.  Part I.A explores the 
differences between criminal penalties and civil remedies and how the 
dichotomous relationship between the two types of sanctions can be difficult 
to preserve.  Part I.B outlines the test devised by the Supreme Court to 
determine whether a measure is considered a civil remedy or a criminal 
penalty.  Part I.C explains why the criminal and civil labels matter by 
analyzing the constitutional protections reserved only for criminal 
defendants. 
 
 21. See infra Part III.A. 
 22. See infra Part III.B. 
 23. 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 24. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 25. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 26. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 27. See infra Parts II.B, III. 
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A.  The Criminal-Civil Distinction 
Criminal and civil law are traditionally understood as two distinct areas of 
law within the American legal system.28  Law students are taught to take this 
dichotomy for granted, as the law school curriculum is divided neatly into 
criminal and civil categories.29  After all, the two areas of law utilize different 
courts, rules of procedure, burdens of proof, rules of discovery, and 
investigatory practices.30 
The division between criminal and civil law is further emphasized by 
distinct categories of sanctions.31  Criminal law subjects wrongdoers to 
“criminal penalties,” which traditionally include arrest, prosecution, and 
incarceration.32  Civil law, alternatively, subjects wrongdoers to “civil 
remedies,” such as injunctive relief, monetary damages, and specific 
performance.33  These conventional paradigms stem from the belief that the 
purposes of the two areas of the law are, or should be, different:  criminal law 
is supposed to punish and civil law is supposed to compensate.34  Despite 
this traditional distinction, however, laws frequently function to accomplish 
both aims.35  
In achieving both purposes, some sanctions may appear to function as both 
criminal penalties and civil remedies.  But the division of laws into one of 
these two categories remains a threshold matter of constitutional 
importance.36  Thus, the Supreme Court has determined that where a law is 
labeled a civil remedy but functions to punish wrongdoers, the law must be 
given a criminal designation.37  The process of determining whether a statute 
 
 28. See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 636–37 (1988) (“The States have long been able 
to plan their own procedures around the traditional distinction between civil and criminal 
remedies.”); Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve 
Criminal Law Objectives:  Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law 
Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1325 (1991) (“[T]his basic division has been a hallmark 
of English and American jurisprudence for hundreds of years.”). 
 29. Cheh, supra note 28, at 1325. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 1332–33. 
 32. Id.; Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions:  The Middleground Between Criminal 
and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1803–04 (1992). 
 33. See Cheh, supra note 28, at 1333. 
 34. Mann, supra note 32, at 1796; see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958) (“If the 
statute imposes a disability for the purposes of punishment—that is, to reprimand the 
wrongdoer, to deter others, etc.—it has been considered penal.  But a statute has been 
considered nonpenal if it imposes a disability, not to punish, but to accomplish some other 
legitimate governmental purpose.”). 
 35. See Mann, supra note 32, at 1797–98; Gregory Y. Porter, Note, Uncivil Punishment:  
The Supreme Court’s Ongoing Struggle with Constitutional Limits on Punitive Civil 
Sanctions, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 517, 517–19 (1997); see also United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 
435, 447 (1989) (“It is commonly understood that civil proceedings may advance punitive as 
well as remedial goals, and, conversely, that both punitive and remedial goals may be served 
by criminal penalties.”). 
 36. See infra Part I.C. 
 37. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).  In light of this holding, this 
Note uses the words “criminal,” “punitive,” and “penal” interchangeably.  This Note also uses 
the words “civil,” “regulatory,” and “nonpunitive” interchangeably. 
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imposes such a punishment, transforming it from a civil remedy to a criminal 
penalty, has been termed the “punishment question.”38 
Using the concept of punishment to demarcate the criminal-civil divide 
has proven to be more challenging than the seemingly dichotomous legal 
world would tend to suggest.  First, punishment is “an imprecise concept with 
meanings that vary depending on the purpose for which the concept is 
defined.”39  As illustrative of this imprecision, Merriam-Webster defines 
“punishment” as “the act of punishing”40 and “to punish” as “to impose a 
penalty on for a fault, offense, or violation.”41  Second, the Court itself has 
acknowledged that punishment plays a role in both civil and criminal law.  In 
United States v. Halper,42 the Court recognized that the “notion of 
punishment, as we commonly understand it, cuts across the division between 
the civil and the criminal law.”43 
Answering the punishment question has been further complicated by the 
Court’s borderline “unintelligible” case law on the issue.44  In determining 
whether a sanction is civil or criminal, the Court has devised several, 
sometimes inconsistent, tests.45  For example, in one variation of the 
punishment test, Justice Felix Frankfurter looked solely at the expressed 
intent of Congress in enacting a statute that withheld salaries of certain 
government employees.46  Reasoning that “presumed motive cannot supplant 
expressed legislative judgment,” Justice Frankfurter concluded that the 
statute was not punitive because Congress had excluded “any condemnation 
for which the presumed punishment was a sanction.”47  In another 
formulation, the Court applied the “rational relation” test to the termination 
of social security benefits of an immigrant deported for membership in the 
Communist Party.48  Under this approach, the Court determined that the 
sanction was nonpunitive because the termination bore a “rational connection 
to the purposes of the legislation of which it is a part.”49 
 
 38. Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of Punishment, 35 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 1280 (1998). 
 39. Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1272 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 40. Punishment, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
punishment [https://perma.cc/ML72-UR2B] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
 41. Punish, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/punish 
[https://perma.cc/KXL2-R9YM] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
 42. 490 U.S. 435 (1989). 
 43. Id. at 448. 
 44. Logan, supra note 38, at 1280. 
 45. Id. at 1281.  Compare Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100–02 (1997) (holding 
that a sanction is not punitive solely because it furthers a traditional aim of punishment), with 
Halper, 490 U.S. at 448–49 (holding that a sanction is punitive where it serves the traditional 
aims of punishment including retribution and deterrence). 
 46. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 325–26 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); 
see also Maria Foscarinis, Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Punishment, 80 
COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1671 (1980). 
 47. Lovett, 328 U.S. at 326. 
 48. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 605 (1960); see also Foscarinis, supra note 
46, at 1673–74. 
 49. Nestor, 363 U.S. at 617. 
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Applying different variations of the punishment test, the Court has 
determined that the revocation of citizenship50 and the extension of 
incarceration51 both constitute forms of punishment, while the revocation of 
a medical license,52 prohibition of work as a union official,53 termination of 
social security benefits,54 and involuntary confinement of certain sex 
offenders are not forms of punishment.55  Given the confusion surrounding 
the proper punishment analysis, lower courts frequently attempted to 
demarcate the parameters of punishment by comparing the sanction before 
them to ones previously addressed by the Court.56 
B.  Answering the Punishment Question 
Despite the Supreme Court’s historical inconsistency in applying a 
standard punishment test, modern Court decisions that consider the 
punishment question regularly rely on a two-part analysis called the “intent-
effects test.”57  The first step of the test, originally articulated in United States 
v. Ward,58 requires a court to ascertain the legislature’s explicit or implicit 
preference to designate the law as civil or criminal.59  The second step of the 
analysis, which is only necessary where the legislature intends for the law to 
be civil,60 requires the court to determine whether the sanction is punitive in 
its effects on those subject to it.61 
To determine a legislature’s intention, a court considers the text and 
structure of the statute authorizing the sanction.62  The location of a law’s 
codification in a civil or criminal code63 and even the title of the statute can 
be helpful in ascertaining intent64 but are not alone dispositive.65  Instead, the 
 
 50. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165–66 (1963); Trop v. Dulles, 356 
U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
 51. See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 434–35 (1987). 
 52. See Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 200 (1898). 
 53. See De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960). 
 54. See Nestor, 363 U.S. at 619. 
 55. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368–69 (1997). 
 56. See E. B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1101 (3d Cir. 1997) (“The only examples the 
case law suggests of effects sufficiently onerous are deprivation of one’s United States 
citizenship that leaves one a ‘stateless person’ and a complete deprivation of personal freedom 
(i.e., incarceration).”); Artway v. Attorney Gen., 81 F.3d 1235, 1266 (3d Cir. 1996) (“The 
caselaw does not tell us where the line falls that divides permissible from impermissible 
effects, but we know the ‘matter of degree’ is somewhere between imprisonment and 
revocation of citizenship on the one hand, and loss of a profession or benefits on the other.”). 
 57. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003); Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 262 
(2001); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361–65; United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 277–78 (1996). 
 58. 448 U.S. 242 (1980). 
 59. Id. at 248. 
 60. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92. 
 61. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248. 
 62. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361 (“The categorization of a particular proceeding as civil 
or criminal ‘is first of all a question of statutory construction.’” (quoting Allen v. Illinois, 478 
U.S. 364, 368 (1986))). 
 63. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 94–95; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. 
 64. See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 288 (1996). 
 65. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 94. 
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court must determine whether the legislature, “in establishing the penalizing 
mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label 
or the other.”66  If the court determines that the legislature intended to impose 
punishment, its analysis is complete and the law is criminal.67  If, instead, the 
court determines that the legislature intended the law to be civil, it will then 
consider whether the law is so punitive in its effects as to negate the 
legislature’s preference.68 
The second step of the analysis involves a high degree of deference to the 
legislature’s purported intent.69  The court will only reject the government’s 
intention if the party challenging the statute provides “the clearest proof” that 
the statutory scheme functions as a punitive sanction.70  Without conclusive 
evidence that the law is punitive, the court must answer the punishment 
question in the negative.71 
To ascertain whether a measure’s effects function to punish, the court 
considers seven factors originally compiled in Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez72 that are commonly referred to as the Mendoza-Martinez factors.73  
The factors include:  (1) whether the sanction affirmatively disables or 
restrains those subject to it; (2) whether the sanction has been historically 
regarded as a punishment; (3) whether the sanction was imposed only on a 
finding of scienter; (4) whether the sanction’s operation promotes the 
traditional aims of punishment:  retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the 
behavior to which the sanction applies is already a crime; (6) whether the 
sanction has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; and (7) whether 
the sanction appears excessive in relation to the nonpunitive purpose.74  
Although the factors are intended to serve as helpful guideposts in the effects 
analysis, the Supreme Court has warned that they are “neither exhaustive nor 
dispositive.”75   
 
 66. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248. 
 67. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 92. 
 68. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 248–49). 
 71. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 (noting that “‘only the clearest proof’ will suffice to override 
legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal 
penalty” (quoting Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 100 (1997))). 
 72. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
 73. See, e.g., Smith, 538 U.S. at 97. 
 74. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168–69. 
 75. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980).  Because the Mendoza-Martinez 
factors can be manipulated or disregarded, they are frequently criticized as virtually 
meaningless. Logan, supra note 38, at 1282; see Smith, 538 U.S. at 113 (Stevens, J., dissenting 
in part and concurring in part) (describing the effects test as one of the multifactor tests that 
the U.S. Supreme Court “manipulate[s]” in “wholly dissimilar cases”); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 
U.S. 520, 565 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (finding that the Court’s reformulation of the 
test “lacks any real content”). 
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C.  The Constitutional Implications of the Answer 
A court’s answer to the punishment question has significant legal 
consequences for those subject to the relevant sanction.76  When a court 
determines that a law functions as a criminal penalty, the law must comply 
with the constitutional protections reserved for criminal defendants.77  The 
U.S. Constitution explicitly protects persons in a “criminal case” from self-
incrimination78 and reserves for criminal defendants the rights to a speedy 
trial, impartial jury, defense counsel, and confrontation.79  Additionally, the 
Court has interpreted other constitutional protections as triggered exclusively 
in the criminal context such as the rights found in the Double Jeopardy 
Clause,80 the Excessive Fines Clause,81 the Bill of Attainder Clause,82 the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause,83 and the Ex Post Facto Clause.84 
The constitutional protections afforded in criminal cases make the effects 
analysis of the punishment test particularly important.85  Given the 
procedural and substantive rights that are reserved solely for criminal 
defendants, penal sanctions undoubtedly impose greater costs than civil 
remedies.86  These additional costs may create incentives for legislatures to 
avoid enacting “criminal sanctions.”87  As a result, there exists the possibility 
that legislatures may structure punitive measures as civil remedies to avoid 
paying such costs.88  Chief Justice Earl Warren expressed caution about 
blindly following the labels provided by legislatures, stating, “[h]ow simple 
would be the tasks of constitutional adjudication and of law generally if 
 
 76. See Logan, supra note 38, at 1280. 
 77. See Porter, supra note 35, at 518. 
 78. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 79. Id. amend. VI. 
 80. Id. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put 
in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”); see Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398–99 (1938) 
(“Unless this sanction was intended as punishment, so that the proceeding is essentially 
criminal, the double jeopardy clause provided for the defendant in criminal prosecutions is not 
applicable.”). 
 81. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993) 
(“[T]he question is not . . . whether forfeiture . . . is civil or criminal, but rather whether it is 
punishment.”). 
 82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 
437, 447 (1965) (“[T]he Bill of Attainder Clause . . . was instead to be read in light of the evil 
the Framers had sought to bar:  legislative punishment.”). 
 83. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (“While the 
State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised 
within the limits of civilized standards.”). 
 84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; see Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 
37, 41 (1990) (“Although the Latin phrase ‘ex post facto’ literally encompasses any law passed 
‘after the fact,’ it has long been recognized by this Court that the constitutional prohibition on 
ex post facto laws applies only to penal statutes which disadvantage the offender affected by 
them.”). 
 85. See Logan, supra note 38, at 1288. 
 86. Id. at 1289. 
 87. Id. at 1288–89. 
 88. Id. 
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specific problems could be solved by inspection of the labels pasted on 
them!”89 
II.  THE RISE OF SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION 
SCHEMES 
Since the inception of registration and notification programs, opponents of 
sex offender legislation have argued that the regimes function as criminal 
penalties despite their civil labels.  Part II.A provides a brief history of first-
generation federal, state, and local SORN schemes.  Part II.B explores the 
initial judicial challenges brought against these laws as punitive measures in 
violation of the constitutional protections afforded to criminal defendants.  
Part II.C outlines the more expansive modern federal, state, and local SORN 
laws enacted after the Court’s decision in Smith v. Doe. 
A.  First-Generation SORN Laws 
Following a series of high-profile child abductions and murders in the 
1980s and 1990s,90 state legislatures began to implement registration and 
notification systems in an attempt to monitor sex offenders.91  In the 
aftermath of these murders, described as “hysteria,”92 the public formed the 
belief that in all of these crimes “the person who did it had a sexual motive.”93  
And in response, the government’s message was clear:  “if you dare to prey 
on our children, the law will follow you wherever you go, state to state, town 
to town.”94 
Inspired by state programs and growing public outrage,95 Congress passed 
the Wetterling Act in 1994.96  The Wetterling Act required each state to 
create a sex offender registry97 and outlined the minimum standards for 
implementation of the registration programs.98  To encourage widespread 
adoption, Congress conditioned 10 percent of states’ federal funding for 
criminal justice programs on compliance with the statute’s requirements.99 
 
 89. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94 (1958). 
 90. See LOGAN, supra note 9, at 49–54. 
 91. See Terry & Ackerman, supra note 2, at 50. 
 92. In the Dark:  S1 E6; Stranger Danger, APM REP. 6:50–7:22, https:// 
www.apmreports.org/story/2016/10/04/in-the-dark-6 [https://perma.cc/9WDT-2XCK] (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Clintonlibrary42, President Clinton Signing Megan’s Law, YOUTUBE (Nov. 1, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Nfp__K9s2M [https://perma.cc/8RH5-9HM6]. 
 95. See ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT:  AMERICA’S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS AND 
THE RISE OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE 14–16 (2006). 
 96. Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. XVII, 108 Stat. 2038 (1994) (repealed 2006). 
 97. Terry & Ackerman, supra note 2, at 57. 
 98. See Megan’s Law; Final Guidelines for the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children 
and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, as Amended, 64 Fed. Reg. 572, 575 (Jan. 5, 
1999) (instructing the states to interpret the Wetterling Act as “a floor for state programs, not 
a ceiling”). 
 99. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(f) (repealed 2006); see LOGAN, supra note 9, at 58. 
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The Wetterling Act applied to persons (1) convicted of certain crimes 
against minors,100 (2) convicted of a “sexually violent offense,”101 or (3) 
designated a “sexually violent predator.”102  A “sexually violent predator” 
was defined in the statute as a person “convicted of a sexually violent offense 
and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes 
the person likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses.”103  
Persons convicted of specified crimes against minors or sexually violent 
offenses were required to register for ten years.104  Alternatively, persons 
designated as sexually violent predators were required to register until the 
sentencing court determined that the registrant no longer met the 
designation’s definition.105  The Wetterling Act further mandated that states 
impose a criminal penalty on registrants who knowingly failed to register, 
but it did not specify the degree of such penalty.106 
In 1996, Congress passed Megan’s Law in response to criticism that the 
implemented registration programs had not gone far enough.107  Megan’s 
Law amended the Wetterling Act to require—rather than permit—
community notification of registration information.108  Despite this direction 
from Congress, states retained discretion over which registrants were subject 
to community notification and how to disseminate their information.109 
Congress supplemented the federal registration and notification 
requirements with the enactment of the Pam Lychner Sexual Offender 
Tracking and Identification Act of 1996110 (the “Lychner Act”).  The 
Lychner Act established a federal database of sex offenders, which was to be 
operated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and made available to 
state officials.111  This central database was intended to facilitate information 
 
 100. § 14071(a)(3)(A).  Offenses included “(i) kidnapping of a minor, except by a parent; 
(ii) false imprisonment of a minor, except by a parent; (iii) criminal sexual conduct toward a 
minor; (iv) solicitation of a minor to engage in sexual conduct; (v) use of a minor in a sexual 
performance; (vi) solicitation of a minor to practice prostitution; (vii) any conduct that by its 
nature is a sexual offense against a minor; or (viii) an attempt to commit an offense described 
in any of [the] clauses.” Id. 
 101. Id. § 14071(a)(3)(B).  Offenses included aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or 
“an offense that has as its elements engaging in physical contact with another person with 
intent to commit aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse.” Id. 
 102. Id. § 14071(a)(3)(C). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. § 14071(b)(6)(A). 
 105. Id. § 14071(b)(6)(B). 
 106. Id. § 14071(c). 
 107. See LOGAN, supra note 9, at 58; Terry & Ackerman, supra note 2, at 57.  When 
President Bill Clinton signed the bill into law, he remarked:  “From now on, every State in the 
country will be required by law to tell a community when a dangerous sexual predator enters 
its midst.  We respect people’s rights, but today America proclaims there is no greater right 
than a parent’s right to raise a child in safety and love.” Remarks on Signing Megan’s Law 
and an Exchange with Reporters, 1 PUB. PAPERS 763 (May 17, 1996). 
 108. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(d) (amending the language of the law to read “shall” instead of 
“may”); Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification:  Past, 
Present, and Future, 34 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 3, 5 (2008). 
 109. See LOGAN, supra note 9, at 61. 
 110. Pub. L. No. 104-236, 110 Stat. 3093 (repealed 2006). 
 111. Terry & Ackerman, supra note 2, at 58. 
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sharing among states in order to effectively monitor registrants traveling 
across state lines.112  Unlike the Wetterling Act and Megan’s Law, which 
relied on states to implement the provisions, the Lychner Act authorized the 
FBI to register applicable sex offenders and disclose registration information 
necessary to protect the public.113  Thus, the Lychner Act allowed the federal 
government to circumvent noncompliant states by requiring registrants 
residing in states that had not yet established a “minimally sufficient” SORN 
program to register in the national database.114 
The Lychner Act also included new categories of registrants that were 
required to register for life.115  In addition to persons determined to be 
sexually violent predators,116 the Lychner Act required persons convicted of 
two or more of the specified crimes against minors or sexually violent 
offenses117 and persons convicted of aggravated sexual abuse to register for 
life.118 
With overwhelming public support,119 all fifty states implemented 
registration and notification regimes in compliance with the Wetterling Act 
and Megan’s Law.120  Each state was also free to build upon the minimum 
federal requirements and, for the most part,121 states chose to do so.122  For 
example, states broadened the number and scope of offenses triggering 
registration123 and increased the duration of the registration period.124  States 
chose to apply the provisions retroactively to people who had committed their 
crimes before the implementation of the program.125  And various states 
opted for more active notification methods such as hosting meetings in 
communities where registrants live, issuing leaflets, and requiring registrants 
to personally notify neighbors of their presence.126 
 
 112. Alan R. Kabat, Note, Scarlet Letter Sex Offender Databases and Community 
Notification:  Sacrificing Personal Privacy for a Symbol’s Sake, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 333, 
349 (1998). 
 113. 42 U.S.C. § 14072(c), (f)(1). 
 114. Id. § 14072(c). 
 115. Id. § 14072(d)(2). 
 116. Id. § 14071(a)(3)(B). 
 117. Id. § 14072(d)(2)(A). 
 118. Id. § 14072(d)(2)(B). 
 119. See Kabat, supra note 112, at 334–35. 
 120. Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan’s Law:  A Study in Legislative Rhetoric, 
76 IND. L.J. 315, 316–17 (2001). 
 121. Several states, including Montana and Kansas, refused to expand on the federal SORN 
requirements and struck down amendments to include adult consensual sodomy as a 
qualifying offense. LOGAN, supra note 9, at 80. 
 122. See id. at 66–79. 
 123. Id. Logan provides examples of additional offenses added by the states including 
public urination, posting an obscene bumper sticker or writing, and seduction. Id. 
 124. Id. at 69. 
 125. Id. at 71. 
 126. Id. at 78. 
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B.  Judicial Challenges to First-Generation SORN Laws 
1.  Lower Court Challenges 
As state sex offender laws were implemented across the country, 
registrants began challenging first-generation laws as additional forms of 
punishment in violation of their constitutional rights as criminal 
defendants.127  Many of the initial challenges included allegations that the 
regimes functioned as criminal penalties in violation of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause,128 the Double Jeopardy Clause,129 the Bill of Attainder Clause,130 
and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.131 
In answering the punishment question with respect to state SORN regimes, 
most circuit courts applied a version of the intent-effects test discussed in 
Part I.B.132  Although each state’s regime varied in scope and severity, lower 
courts consistently found that SORN schemes were nonpunitive, both in their 
intention and application.133 
Nonetheless, several district courts originally struck down community 
notification programs on the grounds that they effectively punished 
registrants.134  For example, in 1996, Judge Denny Chin of the Southern 
District of New York struck down the notification provisions of the New 
York State Sex Offender Registration Act in Doe v. Pataki.135  The law 
provided for different levels of community notification, assigned pursuant to 
 
 127. See Mary K. Evans et al., Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification, in 
SEX OFFENDER LAWS:  FAILED POLICIES, NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 2, at 142, 151.  Although 
many of the initial challenges against first-generation SORN regimes were brought in state 
court and alleged state constitutional violations, this Note looks exclusively at federal 
challenges raising the punishment question under the U.S. Constitution. 
 128. See, e.g., Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 129. See, e.g., E. B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 130. See, e.g., Artway v. Attorney Gen., 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 131. See, e.g., Doe v. Weld, 954 F. Supp. 425 (D. Mass. 1996). 
 132. See Moore v. Avoyelles Corr. Ctr., 253 F.3d 870, 872 (5th Cir. 2001); Femedeer v. 
Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1248–49 (10th Cir. 2000); Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 473 
(6th Cir. 1999); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1084 (9th Cir. 1997); Pataki, 120 F.3d at 
1274.  But see Artway, 81 F.3d at 1263 (applying a test that considered the legislature’s 
subjective purpose, the objective purpose as indicated by the proportionality and history of the 
measure, and the effects of the law). 
 133. See, e.g., Moore, 253 F.3d at 873; Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1253; Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 
477; Russell, 124 F.3d at 1093; Pataki, 120 F.3d at 1285; E. B., 119 F.3d at 1111; Artway, 81 
F.3d at 1267; Byron M. v. City of Whittier, 46 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1036 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Roe 
v. Farwell, 999 F. Supp. 174, 193 (D. Mass. 1998); Lanni v. Engler, 994 F. Supp. 849, 854–
55 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Doe v. Kelley, 961 F. Supp. 1105, 1112 (W.D. Mich. 1997); Weld, 954 
F. Supp. at 436. 
 134. Roe v. Office of Adult Prob., 938 F. Supp. 1080, 1093 (D. Conn. 1996) (finding that 
the punitive effects of the notification scheme were not “merely incidental” to the nonpunitive 
purpose), vacated, 125 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1997); Doe v. Gregoire, 960 F. Supp. 1478, 1486 
(W.D. Wash. 1997) (holding that the public notification provisions were punitive in nature), 
rev’d sub nom. Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997); Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. 
691, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that the public notification provisions were punitive), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 135. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. at 701. 
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a registrant’s designated risk.136  In addition, the law created a “900” 
telephone number service that members of the public could call, provide 
identifying information about the suspected registrant, and, after personally 
identifying themselves, receive information about the registrant in 
question.137  Judge Chin struck down these provisions for five reasons:  (1) 
the public dissemination of one’s wrongdoing was a form of punishment 
dating back to “biblical times”; (2) notification sought to deter criminal 
conduct, a traditional goal of punishment; (3) the dissemination of 
information placed a public stigma on registrants that could create “personal 
and professional” disabilities or restraints; (4) notification was triggered by 
the conviction of a crime; and (5) the negative effects of community 
notification, including public ostracization, threats of physical violence, and 
job loss, far exceeded the benefits of such provisions.138  Judge Chin’s 
decision and others like it were ultimately rejected by the circuit courts.139   
Focusing on the legislature’s “objective manifestations,”140 the majority 
of circuit courts ascertained legislative intent by considering the language of 
the SORN statute,141 the legislature’s stated purpose,142 and the overall 
design of the scheme.143  The lower courts consistently determined that state 
legislatures did not intend for SORN laws to punish registered sex 
offenders.144 
 
 136. Id. at 695–96.  The personal information of “low” risk registrants was not disclosed 
outside of law enforcement agencies. Id. at 695.  The information of “moderate” risk 
registrants was disclosed to “vulnerable populations” but limited to a registrant’s approximate 
address, photograph, and background information. Id.  The information of “high” risk 
registrants was similarly disseminated to vulnerable populations and also included the 
registrant’s exact address. Id. at 695–96. 
 137. Id. at 696. 
 138. Id. at 701. 
 139. See generally Roe v. Office of Adult Prob., 125 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1997); Russell v. 
Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997); Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 140. Pataki, 120 F.3d at 1277. 
 141. See, e.g., Russell, 124 F.3d at 1087. 
 142. See, e.g., Moore v. Avoyelles Corr. Ctr., 253 F.3d 870, 872 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(highlighting that the law’s stated purpose was to protect the public); Femedeer v. Haun, 227 
F.3d 1244, 1249 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding that the law’s stated purpose, to “apprehend[] 
offenders,” was civil); Office of Adult Prob., 125 F.3d at 54 (focusing on the individualized 
clinical assessments as an indication of the legislature’s remedial intent); Artway v. Attorney 
Gen., 81 F.3d 1235, 1264 (3d Cir. 1996); Byron M. v. City of Whittier, 46 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 
1035 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (focusing on the legislature’s stated purpose of “assuring public 
protection” through notification); Roe v. Farwell, 999 F. Supp. 174, 185 (D. Mass. 1998) 
(relying on the legislature’s stated purpose to provide law enforcement with additional 
information to prevent sex crimes); Doe v. Weld, 954 F. Supp. 425, 433 (D. Mass. 1996). 
 143. See, e.g., Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that the 
law’s limited data collection and community notification only when “necessary to protect the 
public” indicated the legislature’s civil intent); Russell, 124 F.3d at 1087–88 (finding the 
limited collection of information through mail-in notices demonstrated an intention to monitor 
registrants, not punish them); Lanni v. Engler, 994 F. Supp. 849, 853 (E.D. Mich. 1998) 
(noting that the limited dissemination of information to persons living in the same zip code as 
the registrant was indicative of the law’s civil purpose). 
 144. See, e.g., Moore, 253 F.3d at 872; Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1249; Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 
474; Russell, 124 F.3d at 1087–88; E. B., 119 F.3d at 1097; Artway, 81 F.3d at 1264; Byron M., 
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Lower courts also found that first-generation laws were not punitive in 
their application to registrants.  Applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors, the 
courts found that both the registration and notification components were 
regulatory in their effects.145  Viewing these laws as analogous to the 
registration systems used in other civil programs, various courts upheld the 
registration components of state SORN laws.146  Similarly, lower courts 
rejected challenges to the laws’ notification components and found that the 
programs did not resemble traditional forms of punishment.147 
2.  Smith v. Doe 
On March 5, 2003, the Supreme Court weighed in on the constitutionality 
of sex offender registration and notification regimes.148  In Smith v. Doe, the 
Court answered the punishment question in the negative, concluding that the 
Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (ASORA) was not punitive in its intent 
or effect on required registrants.149 
In 1994, Alaska implemented its registration and notification program in 
compliance with both the Wetterling Act and Megan’s Law.150  ASORA 
expanded the baseline federal requirements by increasing the duration of 
registration;151 registrants convicted of a single sex offense were required to 
register for fifteen years and registrants convicted of two and more sex 
offenses were required to register for life.152  Although ASORA did not 
specifically authorize a method of public disclosure, Alaskan law 
enforcement created an online database of nonconfidential registrant 
information and made it available to the public.153 
Like the lower courts, the Supreme Court applied the intent-effects 
analysis articulated in Ward.154  In ascertaining the legislature’s intent, the 
Court relied primarily on the text of the statute.155  The Court found that the 
legislature’s explicit inclusion of the law’s purpose, “protecting the public 
 
46 F. Supp. 2d at 1035; Farwell, 999 F. Supp. at 185; Lanni, 994 F. Supp. at 853; Weld, 954 
F. Supp. at 433. 
 145. See, e.g., Moore, 253 F.3d at 872; Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1250–53; Cutshall, 193 F.3d 
at 474–75; Russell, 124 F.3d at 1089–92; Pataki, 120 F.3d at 1280–84; Lanni, 994 F. Supp. at 
854; Weld, 954 F. Supp. at 434–35. 
 146. See, e.g., Russell, 124 F.3d at 1089; Farwell, 999 F. Supp. at 186. 
 147. See, e.g., Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1250–53; Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 475; Office of Adult 
Prob., 125 F.3d at 55; Farwell, 999 F. Supp. at 190; Lanni, 994 F. Supp. at 854. 
 148. See generally Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
 149. Id.  Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Smith, however, the Alaska 
Supreme Court determined that ASORA violated the Alaska state constitution when applied 
retroactively as the effects of law were punitive on registrants. Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 
1019 (Alaska 2008). 
 150. 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws Ch. 41. 
 151. Persons convicted of a single sex offense were required to provide written notice of 
their information annually for fifteen years, and all persons convicted of two or more sex 
offenses were required register for life. Id. 
 152. 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws Ch. 41 § 12.63.020(a)(1)–(2). 
 153. Smith, 538 U.S. at 91. 
 154. Id. at 92. 
 155. Id. at 93. 
1114 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
from sex offenders,” was indicative of its civil intention.156  The Court 
rejected arguments that ASORA’s codification in the criminal procedure 
code157 and the state’s policy of alerting registrants of their duty to register 
at criminal sentencing were dispositive of the legislature’s criminal 
preference.158 
In his concurring opinion, Justice David Souter challenged this position 
and stated that the legislature’s intent was not “clearly civil.”159  Finding 
ASORA to be a “close case,”160 Justice Souter highlighted the legislature’s 
failure to explicitly label the law as civil and the inclusion of the criminal 
components already discussed by the majority.161  Justice Souter, along with 
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer in their dissent,162 advocated for a new test:  
where the legislature’s intention is unclear, the heightened burden on the 
challenger to prove the law’s punitive effects by the “clearest proof” should 
be disregarded.163 
In its analysis of ASORA’s effects, the majority limited its review to the 
following Mendoza-Martinez factors:  (1) history and tradition as 
punishment, (2) affirmative disability or restraint, (3) promotion of the 
traditional aims of punishment, (4) rational connection to a nonpunitive 
purpose, and (5) excessiveness with respect to that nonpunitive purpose.164  
The Court reasoned that the remaining factors—whether the sanction 
requires a finding of scienter and whether the behavior to which the sanction 
applies is already a crime—were not relevant to its analysis.165 
In assessing the first Mendoza-Martinez factor, the Court rejected the 
challenger’s comparisons of ASORA to other traditional forms of 
punishment.166  Given the relatively recent inception of these schemes, the 
Court found that neither the registration nor the notification component could 
be considered “traditional.”167  The Court determined that the programs 
could not be considered forms of public shaming because that punishment 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 95. 
 158. Id. at 95–96. 
 159. Id. at 107 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 107–08. 
 162. Id. at 115 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 163. Id. at 107 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 164. Id. at 97 (majority opinion).  Justice John Paul Stevens proposed a new test for 
determining whether a measure is punitive.  Under his formulation, a law is punitive if:  (1) it 
is imposed on everyone who commits a crime, (2) it is not imposed on anyone else, and (3) it 
severely impairs a person’s liberty. Id. at 112. (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring 
in part). 
 165. Id. at 105 (majority opinion).  The Court acknowledged that although ASORA’s 
requirements were triggered by the commission of a crime, usually an indication of a 
sanction’s punitiveness, the criminal element was necessary to accomplish the law’s 
nonpunitive aim of reducing recidivism. Id. 
 166. Id. at 98. 
 167. Id. at 97. 
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historically required face-to-face humiliation.168  Similarly, the schemes 
were not analogous to banishment because banishment required physical 
expulsion from society.169  The Court rejected arguments that the internet 
notification component resembled public shaming and emphasized that the 
purpose of public disclosure is “to inform the public for its own safety, not 
to humiliate the offender.”170  The Court instead analogized ASORA to the 
publication of criminal records, a common civil practice not intended to 
punish criminals.171 
Considering the second Mendoza-Martinez factor, affirmative disability or 
restraint, the Court concluded that ASORA’s restrictive effects were “minor 
and indirect.”172  First, the Court noted that ASORA did not impose any 
physical restraint on registrants and thus did not resemble imprisonment.173  
Second, the Court determined that ASORA did not involve any active 
supervision of registrants and thus did not function like probation or 
parole.174  The Court noted that ASORA did not require in-person reporting 
to law enforcement but rather provided only for written registration.175  In 
response to registrants’ argument that the public’s reaction to ASORA 
created affirmative restraints on personal liberty, the Court held that these 
restrictions stemmed from their crimes, not from the registration and 
notification obligations.176  
In considering the third Mendoza-Martinez factor, whether ASORA 
promoted the traditional aims of punishment, the Court concluded that the 
presence of a deterrent purpose was not dispositive of the law’s punitive 
nature.177  Acknowledging that civil laws frequently deter crime without 
imposing punishment, the Court declined to give this factor much weight.178  
Further, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s holding that ASORA was 
retributive.179  Although the duration of registration outlined in ASORA was 
based on the type and frequency of conviction, rather than an assessment of 
a registrant’s current dangerousness, the Court determined that past 
convictions were rationally related to a registrant’s risk of recidivism.180 
In assessing the fourth and fifth Mendoza-Martinez factors, the Court 
determined that ASORA was rationally connected to its nonpunitive purpose 
and was not excessive in furtherance of that regulatory purpose.181  
 
 168. Id. at 99 (“In contrast to colonial shaming punishments, however, the State does not 
make the publicity and the resulting stigma an integral part of the objective of the regulatory 
scheme.”). 
 169. Id. at 98. 
 170. Id. at 99. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 101. 
 173. Id. at 100. 
 174. Id. at 101. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 102. 
 178. See id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 102–03. 
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Identifying public safety as ASORA’s nonpunitive goal,182 the Court 
emphasized that the connection between the law’s ends and means was the 
most significant factor in its punishment analysis.183  The majority 
highlighted the notification component, finding that alerting community 
members to the presence of sex offenders was rationally related to public 
safety.184  Concluding that ASORA was not excessive in its promotion of 
safety, the Court rejected registrants’ arguments that the law’s lack of 
individualized assessment and wide dissemination rendered it punitive.185  
The Court clarified, “[a] statute is not deemed punitive simply because it 
lacks a close or perfect fit with the nonpunitive aims it seeks to advance.”186 
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that although ASORA was not 
identical to traditional forms of punishment, its effects sufficiently resembled 
parole or probation and historical shaming punishments.187  Because 
registration requires frequent reporting to law enforcement, Justice Ginsburg 
argued, the registration component functions like supervised release or 
parole.188  Justice Ginsburg concluded that the notification component 
resembled public shaming because it required the state to affix a negative 
label to the registrant and publicize that label to the community.189 
Justice Ginsburg further rejected the majority’s conclusion on the grounds 
that ASORA “notably exceed[ed]” the purpose of public safety by applying 
to all convicted sex offenders without regard to their current 
dangerousness.190  By basing duration of registration on conviction rather 
than a registrant’s actual risk of recidivism, ASORA went beyond the scope 
of public safety.  Most important to Justice Ginsburg’s analysis was the fact 
that ASORA did not account for the possibility of rehabilitation and offered 
registrants no ability to petition the court for relief.191 
C.  Modern SORN Laws 
Following the Court’s decision in Smith, Congress passed the Adam Walsh 
Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006192 (AWA), which replaced the 
Wetterling Act and Megan’s Law and provided more expansive baseline 
guidelines for state SORN schemes.193  Title I of the AWA, containing the 
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act194 (SORNA), details the 
 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 102. 
 184. Id. at 103. 
 185. See id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 115–16 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 117. 
 192. Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.). 
 193. See LOGAN, supra note 9, at 62–65. 
 194. Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 590 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of the U.S.C.). 
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federal standards for applicable jurisdictions.195  As with the prior federal 
legislative scheme, states are obligated to “substantially implement” the new 
requirements or lose 10 percent of their federal funding for crime 
prevention.196 
SORNA differs from its predecessors in several important ways.  First, 
SORNA broadens the scope of existing SORN regimes through the addition 
of qualifying crimes and offenses.197  In redefining the term “sex offense,” 
Congress made SORNA applicable to all persons convicted of a criminal 
offense involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another person.198  
SORNA further increases the pool of registrants by adding new crimes to the 
definition of a “specified offense against a minor.”199  In addition to the 
crimes previously detailed in the Wetterling Act, SORNA includes offenses 
related to video voyeurism, child pornography, and “criminal sexual conduct 
involving a minor or the use of the Internet to facilitate or attempt such 
conduct.”200 
SORNA also imposes harsher reporting obligations on registrants by 
increasing the duration of registration and the frequency of reporting,201 
requiring the collection and disclosure of additional personal information,202 
and mandating in-person verification of information.203  SORNA bases the 
duration of registration and frequency of reporting on a registrant’s tier level 
within a three-tier classification system.204  However, a person’s tier is tied 
only to their original conviction, without regard to any individualized 
assessment of current dangerousness.205  Once a registrant is assigned a tier 
level, that designation is final and unreviewable.206 
Under the federal requirements, tier I registrants are required to register 
for fifteen years and verify their information annually.207  Tier II registrants 
are required to register for twenty-five years and verify their information 
every six months.208  Tier III registrants are required to register for life and 
verify their information every three months.209  Under this new system, all 
 
 195. 34 U.S.C. § 20901 (Supp. 2017). 
 196. Id. § 20927. 
 197. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 6, at 45. 
 198. 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5).  SORNA does not apply to offenses involving consensual 
sexual conduct “if the victim was an adult, unless the adult was under the custodial authority 
of the offender at the time of the offense, or if victim was at least 13 years old and the offender 
was not more than 4 years older than the victim.” Id. § 20911(5)(C). 
 199. Id. § 20911(5)(A). 
 200. Id. § 20911(7)(F)–(H). 
 201. Id. §§ 20915, 20918. 
 202. Id. §§ 20914, 20920. 
 203. Id. § 20918. 
 204. Id. §§ 20915, 20918. 
 205. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 6, at 45. 
 206. 34 U.S.C. § 20915. 
 207. Id. §§ 20915, 20918. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
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registrants must report to their local enforcement agency in person and allow 
their jurisdiction to take a current photograph.210 
In 2008, Congress supplemented the federal requirements with the 
Keeping the Internet Devoid of Sexual Predators Act of 2008211 (the “KIDS 
Act”) to address the issue of online safety.212  The KIDS Act requires all 
jurisdictions to collect the “internet identifiers” of registrants during the 
registration process.213  The KIDS Act, however, does not require 
community notification of such information.214  In 2016, Congress passed 
the International Megan’s Law to Prevent Child Exploitation and Other 
Sexual Crimes Through Advanced Notification of Traveling Sex 
Offenders,215 which requires jurisdictions to mandate that registrants provide 
notice twenty-one days prior to intended international travel.216  The law also 
required the State Department, the Department of Justice, and the 
Department of Homeland Security to develop and implement a plan to mark 
the U.S. passports of “covered sex offenders” with unique identifiers.217 
Unlike the overwhelming support shown for the Wetterling Act and 
Megan’s Law,218 SORNA and its amendments have been met with resistance 
from the states.219  As of November 2019, only eighteen states had 
substantially implemented SORNA’s standards.220  Noncompliant states 
have cited the program’s financial burdens and lack of public safety benefits 
as reasons for not implementing the new requirements.221 
Despite the lack of universal support for SORNA, some states have 
continued to expand SORN schemes beyond the original guidelines in the 
Wetterling Act and Megan’s Law.222  In addition to the state variations 
discussed in Part II.A, states continue to go beyond the minimum 
requirements with the expansion of residency restrictions and GPS 
monitoring programs. 
 
 210. Id. § 20918. 
 211. Pub L. No. 110-400, 122 Stat. 4224 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 34 
U.S.C.). 
 212. Legislative History of Federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification, SMART, 
https://www.smart.gov/legislation.htm [https://perma.cc/G38Y-MYWZ] (last visited Nov. 12, 
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 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Pub. L. No. 114-119, 130 Stat. 15 (2016) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
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 216. Id. 
 217. See 22 U.S.C. § 212b (Supp. 2016); 34 U.S.C. § 21507 (Supp. 2017); see also 
Passports and International Megan’s Law, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, https:// 
travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/News/passports/passports-and-international-megans-
law.html [https://perma.cc/HAV7-4FXS] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
 218. See supra Part II.A. 
 219. Evans et al., supra note 127, at 146. 
 220. See SORNA Implementation Status, SMART, https://smart.gov/sorna-map.htm 
[https://perma.cc/BK25-KFXW] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
 221. Evans et al., supra note 127, at 147. 
 222. LOGAN, supra note 9, at 66–78. 
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As of July 2019, thirty-four states had supplemented their SORN laws with 
residency restrictions.223  Residency restrictions allow communities to 
prohibit a registrant from living, working, or traveling within a specified 
proximity to designated places.224  Depending on the severity of the 
restriction, registrants may be prohibited from living within 100 to 3000 feet 
of a designated area.225  These areas typically include places where minors 
congregate such as schools, parks, playgrounds, places of worship, and 
public athletic fields.226  In some cases, designated areas can include broader 
locations such as “adult group homes.”227 
States have also expanded their SORN regimes by implementing GPS 
programs to electronically monitor the location of designated registrants.228  
Enforcement agencies use GPS technology to both restrict where registrants 
may travel and conduct surveillance on their locations.229  An increasing 
number of states are progressing from passive monitoring, which allows law 
enforcement to retroactively assess a registrant’s whereabouts, to active 
tracking, which provides law enforcement with near-real-time data.230  For 
example, the Tennessee Serious and Violent Sex Offender Monitoring Pilot 
Project Act authorizes the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation to use GPS 
technology to both report a registrant’s location once a day and track a 
registrant’s whereabouts in real time.231 
III.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER MODERN SORN LAWS 
Since SORNA’s enactment and states’ compliance with or 
supplementation of the new federal standards, required registrants have 
initiated a second round of constitutional challenges in the federal courts.  In 
this new series of actions, registrants argue that the harsher SORN laws are 
distinguishable from the first-generation laws previously considered.232  By 
including more burdensome restrictions and broader notification provisions, 
 
 223. See Residency Restriction by State (For Persons Required to Register as Sex 
Offenders), FLA. ACTION COMMITTEE (July 11, 2019), https://floridaactioncommittee.org/ 
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 224. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 6, at 66–78. 
 225. Id. at 57. 
 226. See, e.g., Doe v. Gwyn, No. 3:17-CV-504, 2018 WL 1957788, at *8 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 
25, 2018); Hoffman v. Village of Pleasant Prairie, 249 F. Supp. 3d 951, 954 (E.D. Wis. 2017). 
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2018). 
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Surveillance of Sex Offenders, in SEX OFFENDER LAWS: FAILED POLICIES, NEW DIRECTIONS, 
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 230. Id. at 175. 
 231. Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1001 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 232. See, e.g., Shaw v. Patton, 823 F.3d 556, 570 (10th Cir. 2016) (The registrant argued 
that Oklahoma’s residency restriction was more burdensome than the Alaskan statute.); ACLU 
of Nev. v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046, 1054–55 (9th Cir. 2012) (The registrant argued that the 
Nevada SORN law was distinguishable from the Alaskan statute because it provided for active 
notification.). 
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registrants contend that modern SORN laws have become forms of criminal 
punishment in violation of the U.S. Constitution.233  Part III.A outlines the 
punishment analysis applied by the majority of courts.  Part III.B then 
explores the analyses applied by a minority of courts that strike down 
punitive SORN schemes. 
A.  The Nonpunitive Majority 
Despite the broader and more restrictive obligations imposed by modern 
SORN laws, the majority of federal courts have rejected registrants’ 
arguments that these schemes are punitive.234  Instead, courts have frequently 
upheld SORNA’s guidelines235 and state and local SORN regimes as 
nonpunitive regulatory measures.236  In rendering their decisions, courts 
consistently rely on the same justifications, including: (1) that Smith has 
foreclosed a punitive finding, (2) that the challenged law is analogous to a 
 
 233. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Foxx, 895 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 797 
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1173 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding the District of Columbia’s SORN law); Houston v. 
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SORN law previously upheld as civil, and (3) that the challenged law is 
analogous to an existing civil remedy. 
1.  Bound by Smith v. Doe 
Courts in the majority frequently interpret Smith to stand for the 
proposition that all sex offender legislation is civil in nature.237  Instead of 
reviewing the provisions of the challenged SORN law and considering the 
effects of those provisions on registrants, these courts have held that Smith 
effectively forecloses any finding that SORN laws punish registrants.238  As 
an example, in Herrera v. Williams,239 the Tenth Circuit held that New 
Mexico’s SORN regime was a regulatory scheme.240  Citing to Smith, the 
court concluded that “sex offender registry laws do not fall within the 
purview of the ex post facto clause because they impose only civil burdens 
and do not implicate criminal punishments.”241  Instead of reviewing the 
specific provisions of New Mexico’s sex offender legislation, the court 
simply concluded that there was no evidence “tending to establish the New 
Mexico statute is in any way different” than the Alaskan statute in Smith.242 
In the same vein, the Seventh Circuit in Steward v. Folz243 determined that 
a court need only review legislative intent when conducting the punishment 
analysis for sex offender legislation because Smith foreclosed a finding that 
the law’s effects could function to punish registrants.244  Without discussing 
the particular obligations imposed by Indiana’s Sex Offender Registration 
Act, the court found, through citation to Smith, “that sex offender registration 
statutes do not violate the ex post facto clause if their aims are not 
punitive.”245  Because the legislature had intended the law to be nonpunitive, 
the court concluded that its analysis was complete and the law was civil.246 
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2.  Analogous to Civil SORN Laws 
Courts in the majority have also dismissed challenges to modern SORN 
laws by comparing them to the Alaskan statute at issue in Smith and 
concluding that they are indistinguishable.247  Similarly, courts have found 
that, even where distinctions exist, the additional obligations imposed by 
modern SORN laws do not meaningfully alter the Supreme Court’s 
punishment analysis.248  Applying this approach, the Eleventh Circuit in 
United States v. W. B. H.249 upheld SORNA on the grounds that, although 
the standards imposed more expansive and harsher burdens on registrants, 
the relationship between SORNA’s regulatory purpose and the means used 
to achieve that purpose were not “materially different” from those found in 
Smith.250  Unlike the registrant in Smith, however, the registrant in W. B. H. 
was convicted as a youthful offender.251  Although the court conceded that 
youthful offenders may have lower recidivism rates than adult offenders, that 
fact, the court concluded, “does not mean registration requirements covering 
younger sex offenders are excessive.”252  Instead, the court focused on the 
similarities between SORNA and ASORA, pointing out that both schemes 
grouped registrants in categories by conviction rather than through individual 
assessment of dangerousness and applied different reporting requirements 
depending on categorical placement.253 
The Ninth Circuit in Clark v. Ryan254 similarly upheld Arizona’s SORN 
program despite acknowledging that increasing internet use created new 
threats to registrants’ liberty.255  The registrant argued that these threats, 
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which were not considered in Smith—namely cyberstalking and 
cyberharassment—made Arizona’s SORN law sufficiently analogous to 
public shaming; the law required registrants to provide their online identifiers 
and this “website identification w[ould] likely facilitate harassment.”256  The 
court found that although “[i]nternet use had indeed increased since the 
Supreme Court decided Smith in 2003, the Court specifically considered the 
vast ‘geographic reach of the Internet’ in its decision.”257 
3.  Analogous to Civil Remedies 
Courts in the majority also compare SORN regimes to other civil sanctions 
that have been upheld by the Supreme Court.  For example, the Second 
Circuit in Doe v. Cuomo258 rejected a challenge to the New York Sex 
Offender Registration Act on the grounds that the Supreme Court had 
previously upheld the “‘termination of financial support[] and loss of 
livelihood,’ both of which . . . represent ‘far heavier burdens.’”259  Without 
referencing them explicitly, the court referred to the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Flemming v. Nestor,260 in which the Court held that the 
termination of social security benefits was nonpunitive,261 and Hawker v. 
New York,262 in which the Court held that the prevention of convicted felons 
from practicing medicine was regulatory.263  The Second Circuit reasoned 
that because those sanctions were more burdensome than sex offender 
registration and notification obligations, the New York Sex Offender 
Registration Act was nonpunitive.264 
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in Doe v. Miller265 upheld an Iowa residency 
restriction after comparing it to civil sanctions previously upheld by the 
Supreme Court.266  Reversing the district court, the Eighth Circuit found that 
the residency restriction was not excessive in relation to its nonpunitive 
purpose despite the fact that it applied to all registrants without an 
individualized assessment of their current dangerousness.267  The court 
supported its holding by referencing the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Hawker and De Veau v. Braisted,268 both of which upheld restrictions that 
were imposed on classes of offenders without individualized assessment.269  
The court concluded that because the Supreme Court had previously upheld 
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schemes that did not employ individualized assessments, Iowa’s residency 
restriction was not excessive and did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.270 
B.  The Punitive Minority 
As federal, state, and local SORN laws have expanded in scope and 
intensity, some federal courts have responded by reconstructing the 
punishment analysis to find that modern SORN laws cross the threshold of 
criminal punishment.  Part III.B.1 explains the Sixth Circuit’s decision that 
began this movement and Part III.B.2 details how other federal courts have 
used the Sixth Circuit’s analysis to alter the punishment test. 
1.  Does #1–5 v. Snyder 
On August 25, 2016, the tide of nonpunitive holdings across federal courts 
began to turn when the Sixth Circuit struck down the amendments to the 
Michigan Sex Offender Registration Act (MSORA).  In Does #1–5 v. Snyder, 
the Sixth Circuit held that the amendments to MSORA violated the Ex Post 
Facto Clause because they were punitive in their effects on registrants.271 
More burdensome than the Alaskan statute at issue in Smith, MSORA 
prohibited registrants from living, working, or loitering within 1000 feet of a 
school; divided registrants into three tiers based solely on conviction without 
regard to current dangerousness; and required in-person reporting of minor 
changes such as the creation or alteration of internet identifiers.272  The court 
characterized these burdensome amendments as a movement towards a 
“byzantine code governing in minute detail the lives of the state’s sex 
offenders.”273  The court concluded that these additional provisions 
effectively increased the punishment on registered sex offenders.274 
Adhering to the test devised by the Supreme Court in Smith,275 the Sixth 
Circuit analyzed both the intent of the enacting legislature and the effects of 
the legislation.276  Although the law contained features that could suggest a 
punitive intent—“e.g., SORA is triggered solely by criminal offenses and the 
registration requirement is recorded on the judgment; registration is handled 
by criminal justice agencies like the police; SORA imposes criminal 
sanctions; and it is codified in Chapter 28 of the Michigan Code, a chapter 
that deals with police-related laws”—the court determined that these features 
were similar to those in Smith and declined to find that the law’s intent was 
punitive.277 
In conducting its effects analysis, the court limited its review to the five 
Mendoza-Martinez factors considered by the Smith Court as the most 
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relevant to SORN regimes.278  The Sixth Circuit considered whether 
MSORA resembled a historical or traditional form of punishment, imposed 
an affirmative disability or restraint, promoted the traditional aims of 
punishment, bore a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose, and was 
excessive with respect to its nonpunitive purpose.279 
Considering the first factor, the court determined that MSORA’s 
amendments resembled historical forms of punishment280:  residency 
restrictions mirrored banishment,281 the publication of tier designations 
resembled public shaming,282 and the combination of the residency 
restriction and in-person reporting requirement functioned like probation or 
parole.283  The court compared MSORA’s residency restriction to 
banishment but conceded that the statute did not make registrants “dead in 
law [and] entirely cut off from society,” as William Blackstone had described 
the traditional punishment.284  Although the residency restriction did not 
forbid registrants from physically entering the designated areas,285 the court 
nonetheless concluded that the burdensome geographical restrictions “forced 
[registrants] to tailor much of their lives around these school zones.”286 
The court analogized MSORA’s notification of tier classifications to 
public shaming, finding that the notification of nonpublic information 
functioned to shame registrants.287  Unlike the Alaskan statute in Smith, 
which limited disclosure to public information,288 MSORA authorized the 
publication of a registrant’s tier classification.289  Although tier assignments 
were based on a registrant’s conviction, which is ultimately public 
information, the court concluded that “the ignominy under [MSORA] flows 
not only from the past offense, but also from the statute itself.”290 
The court compared MSORA’s residency restriction and in-person 
reporting requirements to parole and probation.291  Unlike the statute in 
Smith, which placed no limitations on where a registrant could work or live 
and required only mail-in registration,292 MSORA subjected registrants to 
various geographical restrictions and required registrants to verify their 
information in person.293  The court reasoned that, although the degree of 
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individual supervision was less severe than parole, MSORA’s requirements 
had a “great deal in common” with the traditional form of punishment.294 
Looking to the second Mendoza-Martinez factor, affirmative restraint or 
disability, the court determined that the geographical restrictions and in-
person reporting requirements functioned as “direct restraints on personal 
conduct.”295  The court emphasized that although these provisions did not 
place registrants in physical handcuffs, “these irons are always in the 
background” as failure to comply with the provisions could result in 
imprisonment.296 
Considering the third Mendoza-Martinez factor, whether the law promotes 
the traditional aims of punishment, the court found MSORA’s advancement 
of punitive aims to be insignificant.297  As the Supreme Court iterated in 
Smith, civil laws can further the goals of punishment without rendering them 
punitive in nature.298  The Sixth Circuit determined that although MSORA 
advanced the traditional aims of punishment including incapacitation, 
retribution, and deterrence, the factor should be afforded little weight.299 
Under the fourth and fifth factors, the law’s rational connection to a 
nonpunitive purpose and the excessiveness of that connection, the court 
determined that the legislature’s goal of reducing the rate of recidivism was 
only loosely related to the amended provisions.300  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court referenced the legislature’s lack of statistical evidence 
supporting the law’s positive effects.301  The court focused instead on a study 
provided by the registrants, which demonstrated that SORN laws actually 
increase the risk of recidivism.302  The court concluded that given the indirect 
relationship between MSORA and its purportedly nonpunitive aim, MSORA 
was excessive when compared to the minimally positive benefits of its 
effects.303 
Looking at all five factors together, the court determined that the effects 
of the amendments were “different from and more troubling” than the effects 
of the statutory scheme considered in Smith.304  In reaching its decision, the 
Sixth Circuit refused to view Smith as a “blank check” for states to expand 
sex offender legislation.305  In holding that MSORA violated the Ex Post 
Facto Clause, the court warned, “as dangerous as it may be not to punish 
someone, it is far more dangerous to permit the government under guise of 
civil regulation to punish people without prior notice.”306 
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2.  Lower Courts Follow Snyder’s Lead 
In the wake of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Snyder, a minority of federal 
courts have altered the existing punishment analysis to find that modern 
SORN laws can, in their effects, punish registrants.307.  First, minority courts 
perform independent analyses of the challenged laws rather than rely solely 
on Smith, analogous SORN laws, or other civil sanctions.  Second, minority 
courts look to the effects of the punishment rather than the act itself when 
analyzing the “historical form of punishment” prong.  Lastly, minority courts 
consider nonphysical restrictions when determining whether a SORN law 
imposes affirmative restraints or disabilities. 
Courts in the minority have revised the punishment analysis by conducting 
independent Mendoza-Martinez analyses even where there is relevant 
precedent considering similar SORN laws.308  Unlike many courts in the 
majority, these courts lay out the provisions of the challenged SORN law and 
perform a punishment analysis based on the cumulative effects of that 
particular scheme rather than deferring to factually similar cases. 
The decision of the District of Minnesota in Evenstad v. City of West St. 
Paul 309 is illustrative.  In this case, the registrant moved for a preliminary 
injunction against a city ordinance that prohibited registered sex offenders 
from residing within 1200 feet of schools, day care centers, and group 
homes.310  These restrictions were estimated to cover approximately 90 
percent of the city.311  The court acknowledged that there were two Eighth 
Circuit cases on point, both of which considered residency restrictions, but 
declined to find that that they were binding.312  Instead, the court reviewed 
the provisions of the challenged ordinance and went through the Mendoza-
Martinez factors, acknowledging the similarities and differences between the 
ordinance and the residency restrictions of the other two cases.313  In 
considering the affirmative restraints imposed by the ordinance, the District 
of Minnesota highlighted that the ordinance was broader than the other two 
residency restrictions in three crucial ways: “it is intended to protect more 
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than just minors, it restricts offenders who victimized adults without an 
individualized case-by-case assessment, and it restricts residency near group 
homes.”314  In granting the injunction, the court concluded that these 
additional restrictions, “outside the traditional operation of these sorts of 
statutes,” resulted in a SORN program that was “more reminiscent of [a] 
complete ban.”315  After conducting an independent analysis of the 
cumulative effects of the ordinance, the court determined that the ordinance 
had gone further than the residency restrictions considered in precedent and 
these additional restraints altered the outcome of the punishment analysis.316 
Courts in the minority have also altered the punishment analysis by 
changing the focus of the “historical form of punishment” inquiry.  Instead 
of comparing the acts of punishment alone, minority courts look to the effects 
of both traditional forms of punishment and modern SORN laws to determine 
whether they are analogous.317  For example, in United States v. Wass,318 the 
Eastern District of North Carolina accepted a registrant’s challenge to 
SORNA as a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause and agreed that the federal 
legislation functioned to punish.319  In its decision, the court determined that 
SORNA’s notification component “made it a tool of public shame, which has 
been a consistent mechanism for punishment in human history.”320  In 
differentiating SORNA from the Alaskan statute in Smith, the court focused 
on the public’s reception of notification, rather than its actual dissemination:  
“the purpose of the notification here is to elicit a reaction from the public 
who is notified, and that reaction is punitive in nature.”321  The court further 
emphasized, “[a] punitive scheme does not become a non-punitive one just 
because those who bear the burdens deserve to be punished.”322 
Similarly, in Millard v. Rankin,323 the District of Colorado struck down 
the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act, finding that its in-person 
reporting provisions resembled parole or probation.324  The court focused 
primarily on the statute’s requirement of in-person reporting of “‘all e-mail 
addresses, instant-messaging identities, or chat room identities prior to using 
the address of identity,’ as well as any changes of such addresses or 
identities.”325  The court concluded that in allowing law enforcement to 
 
 314. Id. at 1097. 
 315. Id. at 1100. 
 316. Id. 
 317. See, e.g., United States v. Wass, No. 7:18-CR-45-BO, 2018 WL 3341180, at *5 
(E.D.N.C. July 6, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-4547 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2018); Millard v. 
Rankin, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1229 (D. Colo. 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-1333 (10th Cir. 
Sept. 21, 2017). 
 318. No. 7:18-CR-45-BO, 2018 WL 3341180 (E.D.N.C. July 6, 2018), appeal docketed, 
No. 18-4547 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2018). 
 319. Id. at *5. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. 
 323. 265 F. Supp. 3d 1211 (D. Colo. 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-1333 (10th Cir. Sept. 
21, 2017). 
 324. Id. at 1228. 
 325. Id. 
2019] REFRAMING THE PUNISHMENT TEST 1129 
“monitor private aspects of a registered sex offender’s life,” the law imposed 
burdens similar to those imposed on parolees.326 
Finally, minority courts have modified the punishment analysis by 
considering both physical and nonphysical restrictions when assessing the 
“affirmative restraint or disability” prong of the Mendoza-Martinez test.327  
Consistent with the Sixth Circuit’s analysis in Snyder, minority courts have 
determined that modern sex offender laws, particularly in-person reporting 
requirements, can be punitive because they impose affirmative restraints on 
registrants’ liberty.  Notably, in Millard’s review of the affirmative restraints 
imposed by the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act, the District of 
Colorado highlighted that the law required in-person registration at the 
registrant’s local law enforcement agency, a requirement not considered in 
Smith.328  In determining that the restraints imposed by in-person reporting 
requirements were far greater than those imposed by the written registration 
mandated in Smith,329 the court concluded, 
Having to report to law enforcement every time one moves, as well as at 
regular time intervals, is hardly a “minor or indirect” restraint, especially 
when failure to do so is punishable as a crime and also may subject the 
registrant to in-person home visits and public humiliation by over-zealous, 
malicious, or at least insensitive law enforcement personnel.330 
IV.  THE PUNISHMENT QUESTION AND MODERN SORN LAWS 
The inconsistencies across federal courts in applying the punishment 
analysis to modern SORN laws highlight existing flaws in the punishment 
test.  Particularly in cases involving sex offender legislation, the majority of 
courts have shifted the focus of the punishment test away from the actual 
effects of the challenged practice on those subject to its sanctions.  Instead, 
majority courts look primarily to the type of law in question, grouping all 
SORN laws together and categorizing them as civil regulatory programs.  
This approach fails to consider how additional burdens and obligations 
imposed by modern SORN laws, such as residency restrictions, in-person 
reporting requirements, and GPS tracking, can alter the punishment analysis.  
This Part lays out three proposed alterations to the punishment test with the 
aim of eliminating inconsistency in the categorization of civil and criminal 
measures and preserving the constitutional rights available only in the 
criminal context. 
First, the punishment test should require that courts perform an 
independent assessment of the challenged law if the law is distinct from 
sanctions considered in precedential cases.  As discussed in Part III.A, the 
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majority of federal courts rely on precedent without regard to how modern 
SORN laws have created additional restraints on registrants’ liberty.  
Because SORN laws have expanded in scope and severity over time and can 
vary dramatically from state to state, courts must perform independent 
analyses of challenged laws to account for the varying degrees of intrusion 
and restraint on the rights of registrants.  As indicated in the Snyder decision, 
the addition of SORN provisions, such as residency restrictions and in-person 
reporting requirements, can transform a nonpunitive law into a punitive 
one.331  It is thus imperative that courts consider each law independently and 
review all of the provisions together to determine the law’s effects on 
required registrants. 
Second, the “historical form of punishment” prong should be revised to 
remove the requirement of long-standing use and should focus on how 
closely the effects of the challenged practice resemble the effects of 
traditional forms of punishment.  As applied in Smith, the comparison of a 
challenged law to traditional forms of punishment distorts the focus of the 
punishment analysis.  First, the Court in Smith interpreted this factor to 
require the long-standing use of the practice in question.  In the case of SORN 
laws, this inquiry will always work against registrants as registration and 
notification programs have only been in existence since the 1980s.332  As 
technology continues to evolve at unprecedented rates and provide for more 
intrusive methods of monitoring, it is dubious to require the long-term use of 
a practice before finding that it has the effect of punishing someone.  Second, 
the Smith Court applied this factor too narrowly, requiring a near-perfect 
match to the traditional form of punishment.  By requiring that the law 
provide for face-to-face humiliation to resemble shaming or physical 
expulsion from society to resemble banishment, the Court distorted the 
purpose of the punishment test:  to determine whether the effects of the 
challenged measure are punitive.  Courts must instead consider how closely 
the effects of, for example, in-person reporting requirements resemble the 
effects of parole and probation in order to determine more accurately whether 
the challenged law functions to punish. 
Lastly, the “affirmative disability or restraint” inquiry should require 
consideration of both physical and nonphysical restrictions.  Particularly in 
the context of sex offender legislation, review of the nonphysical restraints 
placed on registrants is vital to fully assess the punitive nature of the burdens 
imposed.  Courts must consider how modern laws, notably those containing 
residency restrictions, in-person reporting requirements, and GPS tracking 
provisions, affect registrants’ freedom even when they are not physically 
restrained. 
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CONCLUSION 
The expansion of sex offender legislation over the last ten years and the 
legal challenges waged in response highlight the difficulty of affixing civil 
or criminal labels to laws.  It is not surprising then that federal courts, in 
grappling with the existing punishment test, have disagreed on how to 
properly demarcate the distinction between civil regulation and criminal 
punishment—particularly as legislatures continue to push the limits of the 
civil-criminal divide.  This emerging circuit split emphasizes the need for the 
Supreme Court to clarify the punishment test and affirm the constitutional 
protections reserved for all people, even those society has deemed least 
deserving of protection.  
